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Abstract: Using the optimum currency areas (OCA) theory, this paper aims to
operationalize some of its most conventional criteria in order to ascertain how EMU
will affect regional disparities in Spain. Although there are no definitive conclusions
regarding the regional distribution of potential EMU costs and benefits, the paper shows
that gains may be a little more unevenly distributed than costs, mainly benefiting the
most developed regions. If this indeed is the case, EMU will probably result in a slight
increase in regional disparities in Spain.2
I. - Introduction
Regional disparities in Spain are now much less important than they were forty years
ago. Nevertheless, they remain today a central economic and political topic. The reason
for this is threefold. First, Spain´s most developed regions (Balearic Islands and
Madrid) have a GDP per capita that, in 1997, nearly doubles that of the poorest region
(Extremadura). Second, since the beginning of the eighties, regional convergence in
Spain has been completely halted (or, according to some statistical sources, even
slightly reversed). Third, there is wide concern that, being positive for Spain as a whole,
the potential uneven distribution of costs and benefits of EMU across regions may
contribute to exacerbate spatial inequalities in the country.
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), the purpose of the paper is to deal with the
third point and, through an attempt to operationalise the theory of optimum currency
areas (OCA), to highlight some of the relevant aspects of potential EMU effects on
regional convergence in Spain. As it is well known, OCA theory considers that the
adoption of a common currency brings about both advantages and disadvantages.
Advantages, or benefits, are positively related to the degree of openness of the
integrated economies. Disadvantages, or costs, are not only related to the probability of
suffering asymmetric shocks but are also a negative function of the existence, and
relevance, of adjustment mechanisms other than nominal exchange rate changes.
From an empirical point of view, testing OCA criteria poses at least two problems. The
first one is that, given the different nature of costs and benefits, it is not possible to
provide a precise quantitative evaluation of the net effect of EMU for any given region.
The second problem is linked to the well-known Lucas critique.
The first problem may be partially overcome by accepting, as Gros and Thygesen
(1998) do, that the purpose of this paper is solely to provide some rough economic
indicators showing the approximate strength of the main costs and benefits of EMU for3
each Spanish region. The other problem, although not negligible, will probably be a
secondary one, if we accept (as evidence shows) that sharp, discontinuous changes in
the behaviour of economic agents are quite uncommon. Therefore, it is assumed that
collecting evidence on how economic agents behaved in the past (before EMU) should
provide some clues about how they will behave in the future (with EMU).
The rest of the paper is organised into three sections. The next one, Section II, deals
with the potential benefits of EMU for Spanish regions. Section III examines the
likelihood for these regions of being affected by asymmetric disturbances and the extent
to which they can cope with these shocks by using adjustment mechanisms other than
nominal exchange rate changes. Finally, Section IV offers some preliminary
conclusions.
II. - EMU benefits and its regional distribution in Spain
Standard OCA theory and more recent approaches to monetary integration show that
monetary unions may bring about benefits of both macro and microeconomic nature.
Assuming that macroeconomics benefits will be more or less evenly distributed among
countries (and/or regions)
1, we will focus on some of the microeconomics benefits.
From this point of view, a single currency reduces exchange transaction costs, price
discrimination possibilities and (exchange rate) uncertainty. And, although there is
some debate about the appropriate relationship between them, it seems quite clear that
all these benefits are positively related to the degree of openness of the integrated
economies (Krugman, 1990).
The openness degree of an economy to international trade, measured by the share of its
external trade in GDP, is the subject of some criticism because the ratio tends to be
biased in favour of small and rich economies. Nevertheless, we have decided to use this
indicator in the case of Spanish regions because, in our opinion, there is no clearer and
better alternative
2. Then, we have computed the conventional openness degree ratio for
                                                          
1 .-Indeed, this assumption is very strict, because of the likelihood that economies of EMU countries
(regions) may respond differently to common policy actions.
2 .- We have estimated a (log) linear regression between the openness degree (as the dependent variable)
and population and per capita income (as explanatory variables), and have used the residuals to compute a
new ranking of the openness degree of Spanish regions. The results show that there are no important4
the seventeen Spanish regions between 1988 and 1998
3. The results, shown in Table 1
(columns 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9), indicate that –if we do not consider the special cases of the
Balearic and Canary Islands- the average regional degree of openness in Spain with
EMU countries ranges from a low of 4.5 per cent in Extremadura to a high of 44.2 per
cent in Navarra
4. Accordingly, it is expected that Navarra would benefit much more
than Extremadura from the transaction costs savings and other indirect advantages of
the single currency. Furthermore, these results tend to be corroborated when considering
the increase that has occurred in the openness degree between 1988 and 1998: Navarra
is the region with the highest increase and (excluding, once again, the Balearic and
Canary Islands) Extremadura and Andalucia the regions that has registered the lowest
increase
5.
The openness degrees shown in Table 1 have only been computed with relation to
visible trade, thus the values obtained for the Balearic and Canary Islands are very low.
However, if we take into account trade in services (for which we have no reliable data at
the regional level), it is quite clear that given the relevance of foreign tourism for these
two archipelagos their potential benefits from the introduction of the euro will be much
greater than those obtained in Table 1.
The use of the above openness indicator (either with or without invisible trade) provides
a ranking of the regions according to the potential benefits they can obtain from EMU.
However, this indicator does not offer a quantitative assessment of the benefits involved
for each region. In order to get an approximate idea of these benefits, we have applied
Hallet´s approach (1998), that is, we have computed exchange costs savings as the
product of the bid-offer spread in foreign exchange of a currency against the DM times
                                                                                                                                                                         
changes in the position of the different Spanish regions (most of them even remain in the same position),
except in the cases of Cantabria and Madrid. According to these estimates, Cantabria ranks fourth (instead
of ninth) and Madrid eleventh (instead of sixth).
3 .- The sources used in this paper are: Spanish Customs (Dirección General de Aduanas) for exports and
imports; FUNCAS for regional GDP; and the Bank of Spain for exports, imports and GDP (national)
deflators.
4 .- For the EU14 (excluding Greece) the openness degree ranges from 4.9 per cent in Extremadura to 50
percent in Navarra, with a national average of 22.1 percent of Spanish GDP. The average values of
columns 4 and 9 have been computed in the following way: First, all exports, imports and GDP nominal
values have been deflated to 1986 constant values. Second, all these values have been added for the
eleven years for which we have data (from 1988 to 1998). Third, the average openness degree has been
calculated using the traditional indicator “exports+imports” as a percentage of GDP.
5 .- We assume that EMU benefits are not only positively related to the intra-eurozone openness degree of
each region but also to the rate of increase of this openness degree.5
the openness degree
6. The results obtained, shown in the fifth and tenth columns of
Table 1, should be interpreted with caution. In any case, they lead to two main
conclusions. First, they confirm the previous ranking showing which regions will
benefit the most and the least. And, second, they also show that the relative amount of
these benefits (as a percentage of GDP) is very low in all cases. Ranging from a
maximum of 0.22 percent of GDP in Navarra to a minimum of 0.03 percent in
Extremadura, the average exchange costs savings from participating in the present EMU
is equal to 0.10 percent of the Spanish GDP
7. Although not negligible, it must be
recognised that these savings alone will barely affect the evolution of regional
disparities in Spain.
III.- EMU costs and its potential regional distribution in Spain
The potential costs of EMU for Spain derive from giving up the exchange rate as an
adjustment mechanism (that is, the country would not be able to adjust its nominal
exchange rate to modify relative prices). From a regional perspective, this is not
important because EMU will not bring any changes in policy regime for them (i.e.,
nominal exchange rate changes are not a stabilisation instrument at the regional level).
Then, in order to consider the potential regional costs involved by EMU, two crucial
points need to be analysed. First, it is necessary to know whether EMU will increase the
likelihood of the regions being subject to asymmetric shocks and, second, the extent to
which regions can deal with these shocks using instruments like wage flexibility, labour
mobility and/or fiscal policy.
III.1.- Asymmetric shocks in Spanish regions
According to Krugman (1991), EMU can bring about a change in the pattern of industry
location and, in so doing, promote increased specialization among Spanish regions; if
                                                          
6 .- This procedure implies to assume that all exchange transactions with euro countries were carried out
using the DM as a vehicle currency. Thus, the spread between the Spanish peseta and a foreign currency
is given by the sum of the spread of the peseta to DM and the spread of the foreign currency to the DM.
We have used the bid-offer spread for 1994 as an average of spreads between 1988 and 1998 because we
do not have reliable data of spreads for all these years. The source for the bid-offer spread is the
Bundesbank.
7 .- These results are about 30 percent lower than the ones obtained by Hallet (1998). When the results are
considered in relation to the EU14 (excluding Greece) the transaction costs savings range between 0.25
percent (Navarra) and 0.03 per cent (Extremadura), with an average of 0.12 per cent.6
this happens, the probability of suffering asymmetric shocks will increase. On the
contrary, according to the European Commission (1990), the single currency will tend
to spur intra-industry trade. This will make it much more difficult for a specific region
to be affected by an idiosyncratic shock
8. Although it is hard to ascertain which one of
these two effects will prevail in EMU, the common procedure for identifying potential
asymmetric shocks is to look at the past as an experiment to predict the future.
The extent to which Spanish regions have been affected by different shocks can be
assessed by comparing their economic behaviour over time
9. By assuming that all
regions are subject to the same national economic policy, differences in regional
business cycles originate mainly in differences in their degrees of regional
specialisation. Following Fatás (1997), we use employment growth rates to approximate
business cycles
10. Table 2 and Figs. 1 and 2 show contemporaneous correlations of
employment growth for each Spanish region with both the EU15 aggregate and Spain,
in the first case for the period 1977-97 and in the second for the period 1977-99. Our
findings show that:
1.- For the whole sample, regional correlations with respect to Spain and EU15 are,
without exception, positive. But, generally speaking, they are higher with Spain than
with EU15, the (non-weighted) average correlation being 0.77 with the country and 0.56
with EU15.
2.- Although there is no clear pattern of regional correlation with Spain, this tends to be
higher for the most developed regions of the country. This also happens, but to a lesser
extent, in regional correlations with EU15.
3.- Breaking the sample in 1986, the year of the Spain´s accession to the European
Community, it is shown that for most regions, and certainly for the average, there has
been an increase in their correlation with Spain and EU15. This means that both the
Spanish and European components of the regional business cycles have increased their
significance over time, the latter more significantly than the former. This conclusion
partially contrasts with the findings of Fatás (1997) for the German, Italian, French and
                                                          
8 .- Or by a common shock with asymmetric consequences.
9 .- Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) review different approaches used to estimate the size and
correlation of underlying disturbances across different countries (and/or regions).
10 .- Data sources on the evolution of employment are from European Commission (DG II) and National
Statistics Institute (INE) of Spain.7
British regions: business cycles correlations of these regions increased with relation to
the EU (as in Spain) but decreased with relation to their respective countries aggregates.
From the former analysis we conclude that the concerns raised about a potential
increase of asymmetric shocks in Spanish regions as a result of EMU seem to be
exaggerated. This conclusion is in accordance with the idea proposed by Frankel and
Rose (1996) that closer trade links between two countries are strongly associated with
more correlated economic activity between them, because, as we have seen before, all
Spanish regions have consistently increased their trade relations with EMU countries.
 Nevertheless, fear persists because, although increasingly unlikely, idiosyncratic
disturbances are always possible. According to our results, Cantabria and the Balearic
and Canary Islands are the Spanish regions with the most asymmetric business cycles in
the second subsample (after the accession to the EU). It follows that the likelihood of
being affected by shocks that tend to be asymmetric is potentially higher in these
regions than in the rest of Spain.
III.2.- Wage flexibility, labour mobility and fiscal policy in the Spanish regions
OCA theory states that, when a region is affected by an asymmetric shock, there are
three main mechanisms that it can rely on to try to adjust its economy
11. The first one is
based on wage (price) flexibility, the second on geographical labour mobility and the
third on fiscal policy (or the extent of automatic stabilisers).
When a region is affected by an idiosyncratic disturbance, real wage flexibility becomes
a key element to facilitate the adjustment process. Then, what is the potential role of this
adjustment instrument in the Spanish regions?
Wages in Spain are set by collective bargaining at the provincial level but in accordance
with national guidelines, with the result that there is very low dispersion in regional
wage growth. Following the approach proposed by Abraham and Van Rompuy (1995),
                                                          
11 .- There are, of course, other adjustment mechanisms, mainly from the supply-side, such as market
liberalisation processes, welfare reforms, investment in infrastructure and education, and so on.8
we have estimated (Villaverde, 1999) different specifications of wage equations for the
Spanish regions. The results obtained can be summarised as follows:
1.- Regional unemployment growth, national unemployment growth and regional
productivity growth rates have only a minor influence on the evolution of wages at
regional level;
2.- The main influence on regional wage growth is national wage growth; and
3.- National productivity growth affects regional wage growth mainly through its effect
on national wage growth.
In conclusion, these estimates point to high real wage rigidity at the regional level in
Spain. Thus, it is not logical to expect that real wage flexibility to act as an adjustment
instrument against asymmetric shocks in the Spanish regions. In any case, it must be
recognised that it is not unlikely that EMU, through labour market reform and increased
competition, will bring about greater real wage flexibility among the Spanish regions.
Whether this happens or not in the near future is, nevertheless, difficult to predict.
Since empirical evidence shows wage flexibility in the Spanish regions is very low, a
region affected by an idiosyncratic disturbance must try to count on geographical labour
mobility as a shock absorber mechanism. As a result of economic, social and political
factors (the generalised rise of unemployment, the difficulties dealing with the
availability of housing, the social costs of migration, the level of political
decentralisation, the existence of income redistribution schemes, etc.), regional
migration in Spain has fallen significantly since the 1970´s (Bentolila, 1997)
12. Indeed,
regional migration was, in the mid-late nineties, at its lowest level in Spain. Moreover,
although EMU might also help to promote geographical labour mobility slightly, it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which migration across Spanish (and other European)
regions could be considered as a suitable adjustment mechanism to compensate for the
negative effects of asymmetric shocks.
Taking into account that there is neither sufficient regional wage flexibility nor labour
mobility in Spain, an alternative adjustment mechanism is related to fiscal policy and
                                                          
12 .- Persistent unemployment differentials among Spanish regions are, in part, the result of both low wage
flexibility and low labour mobility at the regional level.9
the existence of implicit regional redistribution schemes. Fortunately, this instrument
has played an important role in Spain as a shock absorber from a regional point of view,
because a large part of the Spanish government budget is centralised. Castells (1998)
has found that, on average, for every 10 per cent increase (decrease) in GDP per capita
in a given region, its fiscal balance deteriorates (improves) by 4.2 per cent; that is,
Spain´s central government budget has provided an important cushion against region-
specific shocks. Whether these automatic stabilisers will continue to operate in the
future is, once again, difficult to ascertain. Unfortunately, both the guidelines of the
Stability and Growth Pact (limiting the size of the central budget deficit) and the
process of regional fiscal decentralisation in Spain (reducing the fiscal autonomy of the
central government) may work in the opposite direction. The alternative of establishing
a truly European “fiscal federalism system” has not political support at present and is
difficult to expect it in the foreseeable future.
IV.- Comparing costs and benefits: preliminary conclusions
The comparison of benefits and costs is complex because they are of different natures;
i.e., as Gros and Thygesen (1998) point out in relation to European countries, it is
impossible to get a precise quantitative idea of the net benefit (or cost) of EMU for any
Spanish region. However, the previous analysis offers some interesting, although
preliminary, conclusions.
First, according to their openness degree, EMU will produce differentiated effects
among Spanish regions. Since, as a general rule, the most advanced regions are also the
most open, these regions will potentially reap the largest benefits from EMU. However,
the total amount of these benefits (as a percentage of GDP) will be fairly low. Thus, we
conclude that although the uneven distribution of EMU benefits may increase regional
disparities in Spain, the final effect will be of a very low magnitude.
Second, in contrast to the conclusions obtained in other papers (see, for instance, De
Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1993), it has been found that asymmetric shocks will
probably play a decreasing role across the Spanish regions. This does not imply that
they may not happen at all. According to our estimates, the likelihood for these shocks10
to happen is greater in Cantabria and the Balearic and Canary Islands than in the other
Spanish regions.
Third, although the probability of suffering asymmetric shocks is low and decreasing
for most of the Spanish regions, it must not be ruled out. If this occurs, the Spanish
regions are not well suited to accommodate the negative effects of these shocks. Indeed,
wage flexibility and labour mobility are very low at the regional level and, although it
can not be discarded that EMU will contribute to reduce wage rigidity and to (slightly)
increase labour mobility, the prospects for the future are not very good. The same
(pessimistic?) view applies, generally speaking, to the potential role of fiscal policy as
an automatic stabiliser at the regional level; this mechanism operated in the past but it is
far from clear it will continue to do so in the future.
Fourth, as a result of the three previous findings, our preliminary conclusion, that
partially corroborates the one obtained in Villaverde and Sánchez-Robles (1999), is that
it is likely that EMU will contribute moderately to amplify regional disparities in Spain.
In any case, this conclusion should be taken very cautiously given the methodologies
applied to the estimates of both costs and benefits and (mainly) to the existence of some
other important benefits (both macro and microeconomic in nature) that have not been
considered in this paper. This is on the agenda for future research.
(*) I gratefully acknowledge the help provided by Martin Hallet, from the European
Commission.
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Table 1
Openness degree and transactions cost savings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Spain 17,89 29,13 11,24 22,14 0,12 14,93 25,70 10,77 19,02 0,10
Andalucía 8,68 12,04 3,35 9,86 0,05 6,92 9,15 2,23 7,91 0,04
Aragón 28,05 46,16 18,11 36,10 0,19 22,80 42,28 19,47 31,24 0,16
Asturias 7,41 12,80 5,39 9,55 0,05 6,03 11,39 5,35 7,84 0,04
Baleares 4,29 3,97 -0,33 3,70 0,02 2,15 2,32 0,17 2,43 0,01
Canarias 11,55 7,55 -4,00 8,49 0,04 8,79 5,46 -3,33 6,36 0,03
Cantabria 12,72 24,84 12,12 18,30 0,09 10,29 19,55 9,26 15,11 0,07
Castilla-La Mancha 8,71 18,09 9,37 11,74 0,06 7,80 16,17 8,37 10,56 0,05
Castilla y León 14,46 42,08 27,62 26,25 0,14 13,55 39,72 26,18 24,76 0,14
Cataluña 25,94 42,85 16,91 32,72 0,17 22,76 38,91 16,15 28,65 0,15
Comunidad Valenciana 20,81 27,70 6,89 23,39 0,12 16,58 23,37 6,80 19,78 0,10
Extremadura 3,37 7,30 3,94 4,94 0,03 2,94 6,43 3,48 4,51 0,03
Galicia 12,20 27,87 15,67 18,53 0,10 10,37 26,13 15,76 16,44 0,09
Madrid 20,61 32,98 12,37 24,67 0,14 16,56 30,11 13,55 20,99 0,11
Murcia 13,42 22,85 9,42 16,01 0,08 10,63 17,57 6,93 12,68 0,06
Navarra 31,44 70,13 38,69 50,13 0,25 27,87 65,54 37,67 44,23 0,22
Pais Vasco 26,24 34,60 8,36 28,36 0,15 21,59 26,30 4,71 23,13 0,1213
La Rioja   10,66 25,77 15,11 16,31 0,09 8,69 22,88 14,20 13,71 0,07
Notes. 1.= Openness degrees in 1988 with respect to EU14; 2 = Openness degrees in 1998 with respect to
EU14; 3 = 2 –1; 4 = Average openness degree between 1988 and 1998; 5 = Average transactions costs
savings in relation to EU14. From 6 to10 the meaning is exactly the same than from 1 to 5, but only in
relation to EMU countries.
Table 2
Regional correlations: Employment growth rates
1977-99 1977-97 1977-86 1977-86 1986-99 1986-97
Regions Spain EU15 Spain EU15 Spain EU15
Andalucía (An) 0,873 0,623 0,513 0,025 0,936 0,891
Aragón (Ar) 0,885 0,648 0,901 0,269 0,831 0,819
Asturias (As) 0,790 0,747 0,092 0,353 0,871 0,830
Baleares (B) 0,649 0,528 0,216 0,294 0,563 0,540
Canarias (Can) 0,730 0,491 0,486 0,337 0,654 0,502
Cantabria (Cnt) 0,352 0,464 -0,240 0,478 0,330 0,387
Castilla y León (CL) 0,859 0,655 0,563 0,128 0,868 0,816
Castilla-La Mancha (CM) 0,780 0,444 0,779 -0,137 0,740 0,634
Cataluña (Ctl) 0,886 0,745 0,630 0,409 0,880 0,910
Com. Valenciana (CV) 0,915 0,745 0,746 0,484 0,915 0,882
Extremadura (E) 0,684 0,324 0,274 -0,308 0,726 0,654
Galicia (G) 0,648 0,369 -0,024 -0,572 0,727 0,686
Madrid (M) 0,772 0,438 0,608 -0,037 0,722 0,629
Murcia (Mu) 0,698 0,506 0,224 0,032 0,667 0,615
Navarra (N) 0,807 0,607 0,771 0,411 0,713 0,674
País Vasco (PV) 0,911 0,697 0,795 0,309 0,877 0,88814
La Rioja (R) 0,789 0,531 0,768 0,275 0,728 0,649
Non-weighted average 0,766 0,562 0,477 0,162 0,750 0,706





























Fig.2. Regional correlations with Spain
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